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NOTES
TELEVISION BROADCASTING AND COPYRIGHT LAw:
THE COMMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION CONTROVERSYt
A community antenna is one set on high ground within the
broadcast range of one or more television stations. The antenna
receives a signal from a station, amplifies it, and, by means of
coaxial cable, relays it to paying subscribers. Created to bring
television to millions of homes where it is normally unavailable
due to topographical interference, community antenna television
(hereinafter referred to as CATV) has become one of the most
prosperous and controversial industries in the communications
field.' Since the CATV signal reaches the television set by cable,
and not through the air, sets not wired for CATV cannot receive
it, and conversely, sets wired for CATV ordinarily cannot receive
signals from local stations which transmit through the air.
This situation has alarmed both local broadcasters who fear the
competition, and network broadcasters who are not able to control
the extent of their audience. This latter consideration is par-
ticularly important with reference to athletic events, where the
broadcaster's contract often calls for the blacking out of a specific
area so that local enthusiasts will continue to patronize the box
office. In addition, movie producers are concerned about the
potential loss in the revenue which is available through licensing
agreements with television stations. For example, if a station in
city A has purchased the rights to a movie, the viewers in city
B may be able to receive the telecast through CATV facilities.
Consequently, the station in city B would subsequently pay less
for the right to broadcast the movie or even refrain from pur-
chasing the movie, knowing that its local viewers had already
seen it.
As a rule, CATV pays nothing to the originating station for
use of the signals. Since the system is not licensed by either the
broadcasters or the copyright proprietors of the program material,
ordinarily a copyright infringement is alleged against the CATV
t Winner of First Place in the 1966 Nathan Burkan Memorial Com-
petition, St. john's University School of Law.
1 FCC INQUIRY INTO THE IMPAcT OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA SYSTEMS,
TV TRANSLAToRs, TV "SATEuj,'" STA'ioxs, AND TV "REPETms" ox
THE ORDERny DvELOPMENT oF TEzszox BRoADcAsTG, 26 F.C.C. 403
(1959).
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station broadcasting any given material in an endeavor to secure
compensation for the right to send the signals.
It is questionable whether such TV signals are within the
traditional protective scope of copyright law. First, it can be
argued that once the broadcast signal is released, there is a com-
mon-law "publication," thus abandoning all property rights in
the television program material. Second, assuming arguendo
that telecasting does not constitute a "publication," there is no
copyright infringement under either common law or statute unless
the signal is "reproduced." The first argument will be explored
by examining the case law relevant to radio broadcasting, and
culling from these cases the criteria applicable to television broad-
casting. The question of whether CATV is "reproducing" the
signal will be analyzed by examining the leading radio copyright
infringement case, whose principles, to some degree, parallel the
CATV situation.
Protection by Statutory Copyright
In general, the protection offered television program material
by statutory copyright is incomplete. The federal constitution
gives Congress power "To promote the Progress of Sciences
and useful Arts, by securing for Limited Times to Authors . . .
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings .... ," 2 When read
in conjunction with Section 4 of the Federal Copyright Act,3 the
conclusion is reached that "everything is copyrightable under the
act which could constitutionally be made copyrightable." 4 Thus,
the statute protects both "authors" and proprietors of certain
distinct classes of "writings." r When the statute is applied to the
television industry, however, a performer, in spite of the novelty
of his interpretative rendition, cannot protect his creations, since
he is not an "author," 6 although he could still qualify within the
category "writing."
In order to warrant protection under the statute, a "writing"
must be both original7 and permanent, i.e., the ideas must be given
visible expression 8 While works such as books, periodicals and
newspapers must be published before a statutory copyright is
obtained,9 materials not intended for public sale, e.g., plays, lectures,
2 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. (Emphasis added.)
3 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1964).4 WARN-Ri, RADIO AND TEvisioON RIGHTS 40 (1953).
5 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1964).
6Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 437-38,
194 AtI. 631, 633 (1937).
7 SPRING, RISKS & RIGHTS IN PUBLISHING, TELEVISION, RADIo, MOTION
PIcTuR s, ADVERTISrNG, AND THE THEATER 116 (2d ed. 1956).
8ld. at 75.
9 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11, 13 (1964).
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musical compositions, and radio and television scripts, can be
copyrighted without publication. 0 Consequently, it would appear
that the statute affords protection to many television programs
which fall into one of the statutory classes. Practically, however,
statutory protection of "writings" is inadequate for the purposes
of the television industry. As to published works, "notice" and
"deposit" requirements"1 prevent copyrighting of numerous pro-
grams. For example, unless notice to the public were to be broad-
cast in facsimile by the television station, the work would be in
the public domain; 12 in addition, copies of "live" programs can-
not be deposited with the Copyright Office.' 3 Furthermore, a
reproduction for sale, without compliance with deposit require-
ments, would end all protection for works copyrighted as un-
published. However, certain programs, such as news and sports
broadcasts, do not easily fit within any of the statutory classes,
either as published or unpublished works. Cognizant of these
difficulties, broadcasters have relied on the traditional remedies of
unfair competition and common-law copyright.
Protection by Common-law Copyright
The common-law copyright was designed to protect a creator's
ideas prior to their publication.' 4 It has been characterized as an
absohte property right which remains with the author as long as
the idea is unpublished. Once in the public domain, however, the
work can be copied, reproduced or performed without compen-
sating the author.' 5
Based on a comparison with the radio broadcasting industry,
and its treatment in the state courts, it is probable that common-
law copyright could be used by the television industry to protect
programs from appropriations. For example, in Stanley v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,"0 a writer brought an action based
on implied contract against a radio broadcasting company, alleging
1017 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).
"-117 U.S.C. § 13 (1964); 37 C.F.R. § 202.2 (1949).
12 SPRING, op. cit. supra note 7, at 299-301.
'13 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).
14 Warner, Protection of the Content of Radio and Telezision Programs
by Common Law Copyright, 3 VAND. L. RBv. 209 (1949). See Wheaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
'I Frohman v. Ferris, 238 Ill. 430, 435-36, 87 N.E. 327, 328 (1909), aff'd,
223 U.S. 424 (1912). Common-law copyright has been preserved under
the statute. "Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the
right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law
or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication or use of such unpublished
work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefor." 17 U.S.C. § 2
(1964).
16 192 P.2d 495 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948), aff'd, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 208
P.2d 9 (1949).
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piracy of a program idea. The court noted that both programs had
the same title, and the title in each was utilized in the same
manner. In addition, in both programs, the master of ceremonies,
well known in motion pictures, was introduced by the announcer,
a drama was presented, and listeners were asked to express
opinions of the play. The court, basing its conclusion on these
factors, held that a concrete combination of ideas for a radio pro-
gram is protectible at common law. Furthermore, this holding
appears broad enough to include the basic dramatic core or heart
of a play.1 7  However, it is believed that copyright protection has
not been extended to generalized themes,18 as opposed to a concrete
combination of ideas.
Many works, clearly not "writings" under the federal statute,
have been protected by common-law copyright in the state courts.
For example, not only has it been held that an orchestra's ren-
dition was secured to an orchestra leader as an artistic work,1 but
also a broadcaster's "voice and style of talking" was considered a
form of "art expression" similarly protected by common-law copy-
right.2 0  In addition to protecting "works" or "writings" outside
the statutory classes, the courts have also given "authors" a more
inclusive meaning. Thus, a band leader, in Waring v. WDAS
Broadcasting Station, Inc., 21 and an announcer, in Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc.,2 2 were held
to be "authors." Therefore, it is apparent that common-law
copyright affords such creators expansive protection, as opposed
to the limited scope of the federal statute.
Although common-law copyright affords a wide range of
protection, it has certain inherent disadvantages which become
apparent when its protection is employed. Thus, in an infringe-
ment action, the author may lack adequate proof of the date and
content of his creation, thereby minimizing his chance for re-
covery. Also, the remedies available in state courts in a com-
mon-law action do not afford the same degree of protection as
17 See Golding v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 193 P.2d 153 (Cal. Dist.
Ct App. 1948), aff'd, 208 P.2d 1 (1949).
Is It was implied in American Broadcasting Co. v. Wahl Co., 36 F. Supp.
167 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 121 F2d 412 (2d Cir. 1941),
that plaintiff's "quiz program" known as "Double or Nothing" was not
within the protection of the copyright laws. Ostensibly, the system or pro-
gram idea sought to be protected was one in which contestants were asked
questions; they were to be rewarded if they answered correctly and they
were permitted to double their earnings at the risk of losing all, by answer-
Ing the second question.
19 Supra note 6.
20Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc.,
42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S2d 809 (Sup. Ct 1964).21 Supra note 6.22Supra note 20.
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those available in a federal court under the Copyright Act. Finally,
and most significantly, while common-law copyright gives the
author a perpetual monopoly, if there is any publication, whether
intended or unintended, the protection is permanently lost 2 3  It is
apparent then, that since many television programs are not pro-
tected by the federal statute, the available remedy must be found
under common-law copyright. However, this protection is con-
ditioned upon a finding that telecasting does not constitute publi-
cation.
Publication
The generally accepted definition of publication is the sale
or giving away of copies to the public.24  A distinction is made
between limited and general publication. A limited publication
is a communication of material to a select number of people upon
condition that it be not further published to the general public.2 5
This principle has been applied to the public performance of a
play,28 the public delivery of lectures, 27 and the playing of a song
in public.28 Hence, in the past as long as a communication lacked
the necessary element of making copies available to the public, no
general publication was found and the protection was not lost.
Though television programs reach an audience of millions, by
a parity of reasoning with radio broadcasting, it may be contended
that television broadcasting does not constitute a general publica-
tion. Since there are no clear-cut decisions to this effect,2 9 it will
be fruitful to examine the state of the law in the area of radio
broadcasting.
Radio
The general principle that radio broadcasting does not con-
stitute general publication was stated in Uproar Co. v. National
Broadcasting C&.30  There it was held that "the rendering of the
performance before the microphone cannot be held to be an
abandonment of ownership to [the public] by the proprietors, or
23 SPaRiG, op. cit. supra note 7, at 93.
241d. at 111.
25 Supra note 6.26Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 435 (1912).
27Nutt v. National Institute, Inc., 31 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1929).
28 Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946).
29 See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc.,
supra note 20, at 727, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 813. It vas there stated that a
television broadcaster does not lose his common-law copyright in a news
announcement. See also King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
308 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934), modified, 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670 (1936).
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a dedication of it to the public at large." 3' The appellate tribunal
agreed sub silentio. Similarly, in a New York case,3 2 the defendant
was enjoined from recording the Metropolitan Opera's radio
broadcasts for subsequent sale on the theory that the plaintiff did
not abandon its common-law rights when it performed over the
air.
Common-law rights in a literary property have also been
upheld in lower court decisions despite communication to an ex-
tended audience. For example, King v. Mister Maestro, Inc. 3
involved copies of the advanced text which were distributed to
the press prior to the presentation of a public speech, the de-
livery of which was subsequently shown in television newsreels
and broadcast over the radio. In a copyright infringement action,
the court held that there was no general publication of the author's
literary work, nor was the subsequent granting of a copyright
prevented. Moreover, in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
Documentaries Unlimited, Inc.,34 the defendant recorded a news
announcement concerning the assassination of President Kennedy,
and incorporated it, without network consent, as part of a phono-
graph record for commercial distribution. In an action for com-
mon-law copyright infringement, the court held that the television
and radio news broadcasts were not publications so as to render
the announcer's "voice and style" subject to appropriation.
Thus, broadcasters and persons in the public eye have been
given broad protection under common-law copyright and seem to
have been granted virtual monopolies on their speeches and
discourses. However, the validity of these state court holdings
has been cast into doubt by two landmark Supreme Court cases
which indicate that federal copyright law may have preempted the
field.
Effect of Sears and Compco
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,35 and Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,3 6 the plaintiffs had introduced lighting
fixtures of a new and successful design. In a patent infringement
action, the district court, while invalidating the patents in each
case, held the defendants guilty of unfair competition under Illinois
law, and issued injunctions prohibiting them from selling products
"identical to or confusingly similar to" those made by the plaintiff.
31 Id. at 362.
32Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199
Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1951).
33 King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., supra note 29.
34Supra note 20.
35376 U.S. 225, reversing 313 F.2d 115 (1964).36376 U.S. 234, reversing 311 F.2d 26 (1964).
[ VOL. 41
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that "because
of the federal patent laws a State may not, when the article is
unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article
itself or award damages for such copying." 37 The Court reasoned
that if something did not merit a patent or copyright, it would
not be reasonable to allow a state to keep from the public that
which federal law has said belongs in the public domain. While
these cases were concerned with patent law and unfair competi-
tion, the Court made reference to the preemptive effect of the
federal copyright law. 3s Although it seems clear that this pre-
emptive effect applies to works which are capable of protection
under statutory copyright (even though protected by state unfair
competition laws), it is not clear whether Sears and Compco will
have the effect of overruling those common-law copyright decisions
which "give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives
of the federal patent laws." '9 If uniformity is the goal of the
Supreme Court in patent and copyright cases, then such a result
may well be realized.
Although Sears and Compco may have an effect on copy-
right law, they certainly affect the law of unfair competition. Un-
fair competition has long been a treasured remedy of the broad-
casting industry to protect itself against infringement of pro-
grams.40 But, under the Supreme Court's ruling, it would appear
that unfair competition laws do not apply unless the material is
first copyrighted under the federal statute. Since much program
material is not copyrightable by statute, it is possible that this
remedy might be unavailable. It is doubtful, however, that the
Supreme Court's decisions go this far. A recent New York
case 41 interpreted Sears and Compco in a manner which indicates
that these decisions will not act as a bar to common-law copyright
relief. It was there alleged that the defendant had exhibited a
television program which included a "substantial segment" of a
motion picture to which the plaintiff had acquired exclusive rights.
The defendant's allegation that, absent copyright protection, the
plaintiff had no cause of action was rejected on the ground that
"appropriation" not copying was involved.
With regard to Sears and Compco, it was held that "these
recent decisions which involved distinguishable factual situations
had not wiped clear the slate of precedent and empowered the
3 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964).8Id. at 231 n.7.
39 Id. at 231.4 0 SPRRiG, RIsxs & RIGHTS IN PuBLiSHING, TELzvsIoN, RA io, MoToN
PicruREs, ADVERTISING, AND THE THEATER 232 (2d ed. 1956).41 Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artist Corp., 141 U.S.P.Q.
461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 22 App. Div. 2d 778, 254
N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st Dep't 1964).
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unauthorized appropriation of artistic performances to the profit
of others." 42 Thus, it appears that the states will not be in-
hibited by the preemptive effect of the federal law where deceptive
or fraudulent practices occur, i.e., appropriation as opposed to
copying.43
Although the ultimate effect of these decisions on copyright
law is unclear, they express a mood in general opposition to the
development or expansion of state remedies for misappropriation
in areas touched by federal law. This broad impact has been
recognized by the ninth circuit in a case dealing with CATV. In
Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV Inc.,44 a local television station, in
an antitrust suit, interposed a counterclaim alleging unfair com-
petition and tortious interference with contract against the plaintiff,
an operator of a community service. The station contended that
the plaintiff's simultaneous broadcast of the programs emanating
from defendant's network affiliate interfered with its exclusive
right to broadcast these programs. The court of appeals held
that unless television stations could demonstrate a protectible
interest by virtue of federal copyright laws in network television
programs, CATV did not interfere with any protected right of
the defendant under common law. The lower court, in enjoining
CATV from duplicating any network or film program to which
the local station exercised a right of first run, relied heavily on
International News Serv. v. Associated Press,45  (hereinafter
referred to as International News).
In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Associated Press had a "quasi-property right" in news which it
had gathered, and that appropriation of the news by the defendant,
a competitor, would constitute unfair competition until such time
as the news lost its commercial value. The court of appeals dis-
tinguished International News since, in Cable Vision, there was
no question of "implied representation" by failing to give the
originator the proper credit, and also the television station and
CATV were not competitors, as were the litigants in International
News. In addition, the appellate court, relying on Sears and
Compco, stated that the district court had gone too far in finding
4 2 Id. at 462.
43 "A State of course has power to impose liability upon those who,
knowing that the public is relying upon an original manufacturer's reputa-
tion for quality and integrity, deceive the public by palming off their copies
as the original." Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S.
234, 238 (1964).
4211 F. Supp. 47 (S.D. Idaho 1962), rev'd, 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965). See also Intermountain Broad-
casting and Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 315(S.D. Idaho 1961).
45248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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a protectible interest not encompassed by the federal copyright
law. 6  Although Cable Vision has been followed by at least one
other court in a CATV case,47 the question as to whether there
exists a protectible interest in program material has not yet been
answered.4 8
Infringement
Under the Copyright Act "infringement" is not directly de-
fined, but, according to section 1 (e), a copyright proprietor has
the exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly
for profit . . . ."-9 This section was applied to radio broadcasts
in Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.,50 where a hotel, which had
no contractual relationship with any broadcasting station, main-
tained a master receiving set which was wired to all rooms. Pay-
ing guests were thus able to hear radio programs over loud-
speakers in public rooms and through headphones in private
rooms. An action was brought against the hotel by the holder
of a statutory copyright on a popular song which had been played
on the air and disseminated by the defendant.
The Supreme Court held that the copyright, in this instance,
applied not only to the original rendition on the air but also to
receptions for commercial purposes. The hotel's act of receiving
radio broadcasts and translating them into audible sound was
said to be "not a mere audition of the original program. It is
essentially a reproduction." 51 Thus, the acts of the hotel in in-
stalling, supplying electric current, and operating the radio
receiving set and loudspeakers, caused the guests to hear a re-
production which constituted a public performance for profit
within the meaning of the Copyright Act. Hence the Court held
there was an infringement.
The typical CATV situation may be distinguished from Buck,
since, in that case the radio station did not have a license to
broadcast the copyrighted material. In general, CATV retransmits
the signals of television stations which have already bought such
a license from the copyright owner. If the radio station in Buck
had similarly obtained the right to broadcast the copyrighted
46 Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F2d 348, 351 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).4 7Herald Publishing Co. v. Florida Antennavision, Inc., 173 So. 2d 469
(Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1965).
4s See Appendix for a discussion of United Artists Television, Inc. v.
Fortnightly Corp., 34 U.S.L. WEr, 2651 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1966). That
case, which held CATV subject to the copyright law, was decided subse-
quent to the submission of the article to the award selection committee.
4 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1964).
50283 U.S. 191 (1931).
51 Id. at 200.
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material, a license for its commercial use and distribution by the
hotel company might have been implied.5 2
Furthermore, while it may be argued that CATV is relaying
broadcasts in the same manner as the hotel in Buck, the fact
situation may also be distinguishable in that it is not the CATV
operator, but the subscriber, who, by activating his set, converts
electrical impulses to an intelligible product-the infringing
activity in Buck. CATV, on the other hand, is involved in an
earlier stage of the reception process, i.e., while the radio waves
are still "free" in the atmosphere. It is submitted that while
CATV may "reproduce" the signal in a technical sense, viz., by
receiving dissipated electromagnetic radiations, amplifying them,
and transforming them into electrical impulses, they do not re-
produce them in the sense that was discussed in Buck.
Buck relied heavily on the "multiple performance" doctrine,
i.e., that every transmission, reproduction, exhibition or original
broadcast constitutes a separate performance. This doctrine finds
its greatest application in the case of phonograph records. 53  It
is said that one performance occurs at the time the rendition is
recorded, and the second occurs if and when the record is played
on a phonograph. Unless the common-law copyright has been
lost through sale, this playing will constitute an infringement
provided it is unauthorized and is both public and for profit.54
In extending this doctrine to radio broadcasting, the Buck Court
drew the following analogy:
The transmitted radio waves require a receiving set for their detection and
translation into audible sound waves, just as the record requires another
mechanism for the reproduction of the recorded composition. In neither
case is the original program heard; and, in the former, complicated electric
instrumentalities are necessary for its adequate reception and distribution.
Reproduction in both cases amounts to a performance.55
This analogy has been severely criticized on conceptual grounds.56
It is argued that the conclusion that playing a phonograph record
constitutes a performance separate and in addition to the record-
ing performance does find support in the express language of
the Copyright Act conferring upon the copyright owner the
exclusive right to "play" and to "perform" a "record." 57 But,
52Compare Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931),
with Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929).
53Nimmer, The Nature of the Rights Protected by Copyright, 10
U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 60, 85 (1962).54 Irving Berlin, Inc. v. Daigle, 31 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1929); Buck v.
Heretis, 24 F2d 876 (E.D.S.C. 1928).
55 Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., supra note 52, at 200-01.
56 Nimmer, supra note 53, at 91-92.
57 17 U.S.C. § I(c)-(e) (1964).
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the argument continues, it does not follow that a separate per-
formance occurs when there is a reproduction per se of sound
waves, for it can hardly be said, within the meaning of the
statute, that a person receiving a radio or television broadcast
"performs" any form of record in which the thought of an author
may be copyrighted.-'
Nevertheless, the attempt to distinguish the activity of CATV
from that of the hotel in Buck is not entirely persuasive. The
infringement in Buck was held to flow from the reception of
radio broadcasts and the translation of them for commercial pur-
poses into audible sound. It can be argued under the Buck
rationale, as well as in the CATV situation, that a middleman
is "reaping what others have sown," and certainly CATV's
reception of television signals is more closely related to its business
than was the hotel's action in Buck.
Since the question of whether CATV operations constitute
a reproduction of television broadcasts remains unsettled, it can
only be conjectured as to whether the multiple performance doc-
trine or any other copyright theory 5 9 will be extended to CATV
to render its activities a copyright infringement. There is evidence,
however, to indicate that some courts favor the free dissemination
of broadcast signals. For example, in Z Bar Net, Inc. v. Helena
Television, 11c., 60 a CATV case, it was held, under a state copyright
statute, that by broadcasting programs on a network station and
consenting to the rebroadcasting of such programs by a local
station, plaintiffs had intentionally made them public. The court
reasoned "that the activities of the defendant . . . do not constitute
an infringement upon, or a violation of, any rights or privileges
of either of the plaintiffs in this action." -
Possible Remedies
In evaluating the remedies available to alleviate the CATV
copyright problem, 2 it is important to weigh the conflicting in-
58 17 U.S.C. § I(e) (1964). Professor Nimmer also points to "a differ-
ence in kind between . . . situations where the sound waves which transmit
the rendition are heard at two different points in time, as with phonograph
records, and . . . where the sound waves are heard at the same time at
two geographic points, as with radio broadcasts." Nimmer, supra note 53,
at 88.
59 CATV operators could use an "implied license" defense, since there
may be no express reservation in the station's license against multiple per-
formances. In Buck, the broadcasting station itself was not licensed by
the copyright proprietor to perform the work. The Court suggested that
if the station had been licensed, the defendant-hotel might have been en-
titled to transmit the additional performance as an implied term of the
license. See Nimmer, supra note 53, at 90.
60 125 U.S.P.Q. 595 (D.C. Mont. 1960).
el Id. at 596. (Emphasis added.)
02 H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106 (1965).
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terests of the broadcasters and copyright proprietors, on the one
hand, and CATV operators and their subscribers on the other.
The first point which may be argued on behalf of CATV
for exemption under the copyright law is that a CATV system
does nothing more than provide its subscribers with a service for
improving their television reception, since the expense of paying
copyright royalties would, of necessity, be passed on to the in-
dividual CATV subscribers. A finding that CATV is within
the Copyright Act, therefore, would discriminate between those
viewers who need no special equipment to get good reception and
those who do.
Second, it may be maintained that the content of telecasts
relayed to subscribers is impossible to control, and a CATV
operator does not know in advance what works will be performed
in the telecasts. To obtain blanket clearance in advance would be
impossible and the maintenance of a clearing house system large
enough to insure against multiple suits for copyright infringe-
ment would result in a giant monopoly for copyright owners.
Such a monopoly could place CATV at the mercy of capricious
proprietors who might unreasonably withhold permission for
appropriation.
Finally, it can be contended that copyright proprietors are
actually receiving sufficient royalties, since broadcasters now pay
performance royalties based on the ultimate size of the audience,
which includes CATV subscribers. It is apparent that CATV
operators actually benefit copyright owners by increasing the
advertising revenue of broadcasters, hence augmenting the royal-
ties payable to the copyright proprietors. To demand additional
payment constitutes an unwarranted double reward.
The first point in the argument for inclusion of CATV under
the copyright law is that such a system is more than a passive
device or service. It is a complicated instrumentality which
transmits television programs to the public in the same manner as a
broadcaster. It not only takes a "free ride" on what the broad-
caster has produced, but makes a direct charge to the public
for the reception of its transmissions.
Second, with CATV, it is evident that owners of copyrights
cannot control the distribution of their work. In many cases (for
example, motion pictures or syndicated series) where the dissem-
ination of a work is intended by the copyright holder for a certain
territory and audience, a CATV transmission can mean the loss
of a market for the work. Such a loss could be quite imposing when
multiplied many times throughout the country.
Finally, it is maintained that there are very many CATV
systems prospering, and they neither need nor deserve a "free
ride" at the expense of copyright owners, or in competition with
local broadcasters, wired music services, and other users who
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are forced to pay royalties. It may also be averred that CATV
activities constitute a moral wrong similar to the old system of
"bicycling" movies from one theater to another to avoid paying
for a second license.
In evaluating these conflicting arguments, the House Judiciary
Committee recognized that advance clearance for all transmitted
program material was a real problem. But, it was concluded that
CATV did not warrant exemption. Consequently, a statute was
drafted which granted copyright holders the exclusive right "to
transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or exhibition
to the public by means of any device or process." 13 However,
in another section the objection of unfair prejudice to those out-
side ordinary television broadcast range was met by providing
an exemption to nonprofit operators who transmit "without altering
or adding to the content of the original transmission, without any
purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage, and without
charge to the recipients." 64
This proposed legislation, that would put CATV under the
jurisdiction of the copyright statute, seems in general to be
equitable. Nevertheless, to impose upon CATV operators, with-
out qualification, the burden of paying royalties might have an
adverse effect on the viewing public which relies on profitable
CATV operations for television reception.
While the television industry has thus far been largely un-
successful in its actions against CATV for copyright infringement
and unfair competition, relief may be forthcoming from the Federal
Communications Commission. Although the FCC cannot resolve
the copyright question, as it is not the proper forum for the
adjudication of property rights,65 it is concerned with regulating
the broadcasting industry so as to provide for the "public in-
terest." 6 Guided by this objective, the FCC has reversed an
earlier decision, 7 and has recently decided to exert jurisdiction
over CATV. 5  While the precise effect that FCC control will
have on the copyright problem is not yet determinable, it appears
that such control might reduce the urgency for instituting copy-
right infringement actions pending the institution of more effective
legislation. In the final analysis, the resolution of this dilemma
63 H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106(b) (3) (B) (1965).
64 H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 109(5) (1965).
,6 FCC, INQUIRY INTO THE IMPACr OF CommuNiTY ANTENNA SYSTEMS,
TV TRANsLAToRS, TV "SAT rrE" STATIONS, AND TV BROADCASTING,
26 F.C.C. 403, 430 (1959).
68FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940); FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
67 FCC, -upra note 65.
6sDocket No. 14895, 30 Fed. Reg. 6038 (1965); Docket No. 15971,
30 Fed. Reg. 6078 (1965). See also Newsweek, Feb. 28, 1966, pp. 67-68.
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might lie in coordinating FCC regulations with the copyright law.
The effect would be to permit CATV to function unhampered
by copyright infringement actions, while at the same time pro-
tecting the interests of broadcasters and copyright proprietors
through regulations promulgated by the FCC.
Conclusion
While in the past, protection of television program material
by statutory copyright has been shunned by the broadcasting
industry in favor of common-law protection, with the advent of
the Sears and Compco cases and the drafting of a new copyright
law, this form of protection will probably become popular.
Traditionally, only "writings" and "authors" were protected by
statute, but draftsmen today are considering expanding the pro-
tection to include electronic transmissions. If this type of
protection is adopted, the question that the Supreme Court in
Buck had to face would be avoided, viz., whether the alleged
infringement constituted a reproduction of the copyright material.
Finally, FCC regulations should put the infringement problem
into its correct perspective by controlling the range and frequency
of CATV broadcasts, thus protecting the interests of the copyright
proprietors by eliminating pecuniary losses in connection with
licensing agreements and exclusive broadcasts.
Appendix
United Artists Television, Inc., v. Fortnightly Corp.,69 decided
after the initial submission of this note, held that a CATV re-
transmission of copyrighted motion pictures, leased only for showing
on specified television stations, constituted an infringing perform-
ance under copyright law.
In arriving at the conclusion that CATV was infringing upon
copyrighted works, the Court eschewed technical distinctions
between CATV operations and a classical "performance" under
the Copyright Act, and relied on the substance of the transmission
rather than its form.
The crucial fact, as pointed out by the Court, is that "the
CATV system has performed copyrighted works publicly and for
profit by the transmission of electromagnetic waves representing
the sights and sounds of said works." 70 Since CATV made
available to an audience a reproduction of a primary performance,
the Court decided that CATV was executing a function so closely
,934 U.S.L. W=mI 2651 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1966).70 United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 34 U.S.L. WEEK
2651 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1966).
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related to the original performance, that the effect should be
treated as though there were a "performance" under the Act.
"The economic realities demonstrate that the CATV system is
in the business of selling television programs to the public." 71
The Court relied heavily on Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty
Co.,7 2 discussed in detail in the body of the note, which held that
"public reception for profit in itself constitutes an infringement
of the copyright proprietor's exclusive right to perform." 73 The
District Court in Fortnightly felt constrained to follow Buck, citing
the fact that in an era of technological development, courts must
be flexible in utilizing dictionary definitions. In addition, the
Court struck down the defense of an implied-in-law license for
commercial TV reception and distribution of a telecast perfor-
mance. From the Court's point of view, the issue was not whether
an implied-in-law license existed, but rather whether the CATV
station should be allowed to profit at the licensee's expense-it
decided that it should not. It is interesting to note that in Buck,
the Supreme Court had pointed out that if the radio station had
obtained authorization to broadcast the copyrighted material, the
decision might have been different.7 4  A lower federal court had
held there was no infringement where the initial broadcast was
licensed.7 5 In holding that such an implied-in-law license should
not exist, the Court appears to have made a value judgment based
on economic realities rather than judicial interpretation.
The result in this case underscores the flexible approach
adopted by the courts in construing Section 1 (c) and (d) of the
Copyright Act.7 6 In holding CATV liable for infringement, the
Court in Fortnightly has significantly advanced the broad protective
scope of copyright law.
X
DISSOLUTION OF THE CLOSE CORPORATION
Conceived in practical business necessity, but born into the
restraint of existing corporate norms, the close corporation stands
today as a species of business enterprise finally achieving its
rightful place in the legal spectrum. The typical close corporation
is formed by several businessmen who otherwise would have
71 Ibid.
72283 U.S. 191 (1931).
73 U.S. CoxrsT., art. I, § 8.
74 Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 199, n.5 (1931).
75 Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929).
7 17 U.S.C. § I(c), (d) (Supp. 1965). The Court by-passed the other
charges made by the copyright owner under these sections and limited the
decision to the issue of whether CATV had infringed the performing rights.
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